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As the century draws to a close, criticisms of both Marxian and non-Marxian class analysis continue to escalate, with many contemporary commentators now feeling bold enough to argue that the concept of class is "ceasing to do any useful work for sociology" (Pahl 1989, p. 710; also, Pakulski and Waters 1996a; 1996b; 1996c; Lee and Turner 1996; Clark 1996; Joyce 1995; Kingston 2000; Clark and Lipset 1991) . By way of response, the most ardent defenders of class models have simply reaffirmed the class analytic status quo, albeit sometimes with the concession that class-based formulations now apply in weakened form (e.g., Wright 1997; Devine 1997; Marshall 1997; Lee 1996; Manza and Brooks 1996; Crompton 1993; Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1993; Goldthorpe and Marshall 1992) . The debate between these two camps has proceeded along quite stylized lines. Indeed, while the literature is well-stocked with all manner of defense and critique of conventional class analysis, there have been few, if any, truly reconstructive efforts to refashion class analysis afresh.
Against this intellectual backdrop, Grusky and Sørensen (1998) recently argued that critics of class analysis have too quickly dismissed the power of class analytic language, whereas defenders of class analysis have not appreciated that such language, for all its power, yields little insight when applied to conventional, highly aggregate classes. This formulation leads to the prescription that class analysis should be ratcheted down to an analytic level where real social groupings (i.e., "occupations") form around functional niches in the division of labor. The great virtue of disaggregating is that the nominal categories of conventional class analysis can be replaced by gemeinschaftlich groupings that are embedded in the very fabric of society and are thereby meaningful not merely to sociologists but to the lay public as well.
The present paper lays out the research agenda implied by this approach. We begin by reviewing the rationale for disaggregation and its implications for empirical analyses carried out either with neoMarxian representations of class or with conventional socioeconomic or prestige scales. After completing this review, we will then show that sociological models constructed with reference to disaggregate class schemes come close to assuming "structural form" (e.g., Duncan 1975) , since the underlying analytic categories are meaningful entities and are accordingly responsive to real institutional forces. This claim will be illustrated with respect to such core sociological topics as (a) the underlying structure of social classes, (b) the reproduction of inequality across generations and over the lifecourse, (c) the social processes by which income streams are attached to occupations, and (d) the consequences of class membership for lifestyles, attitudes, and consumption practices. We suggest below that existing results in each of these subfields are potentially misleading and that disaggregation makes it possible to establish new findings on firmer, realist ground.
The Case for Disaggregation
The following discussion summarizes the main virtues of disaggregation in understanding patterns of class identification, social closure, collective action, and lifestyles and attitudes. For each of these topics, our summary of the conceptual rationale for disaggregation will be brief, as we are more interested in outlining the research agenda that our approach suggests than rehearsing a conceptual case that has already been made elsewhere (see Grusky and Sørensen 1998) .
Class Identification
We can usefully begin our review by considering the subjective domain of stratification as revealed in patterns of class identification and awareness. Although some sociologists remain convinced that contemporary identities are strongly shaped by aggregate affiliations (e.g., Marshall et al. 1988 ), the prevailing post-Marxist position is that conventional classes now have only a weak hold over workers. For example, Emmison and Western (1990) report that only 7 percent of all Australians regard their social class as a "very important" identity, while other commentators (e.g., Saunders 1989) have stressed that open-ended queries about class identification tend to yield confused responses, refusals to answer, and even explicit denials that classes exist. This evidence has led many sociologists to conclude that class is now a "passive identity" (Bradley 1996, p. 72) and that the realm of production is no longer the principal locus of identity formation.
For all their popularity, we regard such accounts as overreactive to concerns that, while real enough, surely do not require abandoning class analysis altogether. The Emmison-Western results are again revealing on this point, since they suggest that structuralist formulations can be salvaged by simply returning to the old sociological standby of occupation (see Emmison and Western 1990, pp. 247-48) . 1 It should come as no surprise that detailed occupations continue to be one of the main social identities for contemporary workers. After all, occupational categories are deeply embedded in the institutions of advanced industrialism, whereas aggregate classes are highly abstract constructs that have currency among academics more than workers, employers, or the state. As Treiman (1977) notes, workers invariably represent their career aspirations in occupational terms, while professional and vocational schools train workers for occupationally defined skills, and employers construct and advertise jobs in terms of corresponding occupational designations. The class analytic fallacy thus amounts to insisting on aggregate categories even when disaggregate ones are more deeply institutionalized.
Social Closure
If the foregoing subjectivist models of class were once dominant in sociology (e.g., Warner et al. 1949) , they have now been superseded by analytic approaches that focus on the social processes by which class membership is restricted to qualified eligibles (Freidson 1994, pp. 80-84; Manza 1992; Murphy 1988; Collins 1979; Parkin 1979; Weber [1922 Weber [ ] 1968 ). These models emphasize not only the institutionalized means by which closure is secured (e.g., private property, credentials, licenses) but also the efforts of excluded parties to challenge these institutions and the inequality that they maintain. While closure theory provides, then, a new sociological language for understanding interclass relations, the actual class mappings posited by closure theorists have proven to be standard aggregate fare. The two-class solution proposed, for example, by Parkin (1979, p. 58) features (a) an exclusionary class comprising those who control productive capital or professional services, and (b) a subordinate class comprising all those who are excluded from these positions of control.
We might usefully ask whether an aggregate formulation is fundamental to closure theory or merely a superfluous adjunct. The latter interpretation strikes us as more plausible; that is, if closure theory could somehow be reinvented without the coloration of class analytic convention, its authors would likely emphasize that the real working institutions of closure (i.e., professional associations, craft unions) are largely local associations "representing the credential-holders themselves" (Murphy 1988, p. 174) . These associations establish and enforce local jurisdictional settlements that prevent other occupations from providing competing services. In most cases, the associated closure devices (e.g., licensing, credentialing, apprenticeships) do not govern entry to aggregate classes, but instead serve only to control entry (and exit) at the more detailed occupational level. By contrast, there are no analogous organizations that represent aggregate classes, nor are there jurisdictional settlements or closure devices that are truly aggregate in scope. This conclusion implies that conventional aggregate mappings of "exploitation classes" (e.g., Wright 1997; conceal the highly disaggregate level at which rent is extracted and interests are formed (see Sørensen 2001; . Indeed, given that unions and associations establish local rather than classwide restrictions on labor supply, the "rent" that is thereby generated should create interests principally at the disaggregate level.
Collective Action
For most neo-Marxists, social closure is of interest not because it provides a vehicle for pursuing purely local interests (i.e., "trade union consciousness"), but rather because it allegedly facilitates the development of classwide interests and grander forms of inter-class conflict. The aggregate classes identified by contemporary sociologists have so far shown a decided reluctance to act in accord with such theorizing. This quiescence at the aggregate level has led to considerable neo-Marxian handwringing as well as more radical claims that postmodern interests are increasingly defined and established outside the realm of production (e.g., Laraña, Johnston, and Gusfield 1994) . The latter form of postmodernism, popular as it is, overlooks the simple fact that much collective action flows unproblematically out of structurally defined groupings, albeit only when those groupings are defined in less aggregate terms than is conventionally the case. The three principal types of collective action at the level of unit occupations are (a) downwardly directed closure strategies designed to restrict access to occupational positions, (b) lateral competitive struggles between occupational associations over functional niches in the division of labor, and (c) upwardly directed collective action oriented toward securing occupation-specific benefits (e.g., monopoly protection) from the state and from employers.
We thus concur with Krause (1971, p. 87 ) that "there has historically been more occupation-specific consciousness and action than cross-occupational combination" (also, see Freidson 1994, pp. 75-91) . This is not to suggest that local conflict at the unit occupational level drives the course of human history. To the contrary, local associations typically pursue purely sectional objectives, and the wider systemic effects of such micro-level conflict are neither obvious nor necessarily profound (cf. Durkheim [1893] 1933). While we might conclude, then, that our disaggregate class analysis is an intellectually modest project, it bears noting that aggregate class analysts have likewise scaled back their ambitions and effectively discarded comprehensive class-based theories of history (e.g., Goldthorpe and Marshall 1992, p. 385) .
Class Outcomes
In this sense, the class analytic project is becoming gradually more limited it its objectives, with many contemporary scholars now satisfied to merely document that class membership conditions individual-level outcomes (e.g., attitudes, voting behavior, lifestyles). The resulting analyses typically examine either the categorical effects of aggregate classes or the gradational effects of variables that represent the many dimensions (e.g., "substantive complexity") underlying disaggregate occupations.
Although these approaches have yielded new and important results, it is nonetheless troubling that they typically conceal or ignore the gemeinschaftlich character of disaggregate occupations. If modern closure is indeed secured principally at the detailed occupational level, then the resulting restriction of social interaction will generate and maintain occupational subcultures that are correspondingly disaggregate.
These local cultures are initially forged through intensive secondary socialization of the kind provided in apprenticeships, police and military academies, and graduate and professional schools. As Caplow (1954) noted long ago, many occupations require prolonged training that serves to inculcate explicit codes of behavior, whereas aggregate classes have no comparable influence or authority over secondary patterns of socialization. The occupational habitus is further strengthened insofar as workers choose occupations that are receptive to their values while employers choose workers with values that are (putatively) compatible with occupational demands. The great failing, then, of conventional analyses of lifestyles, dispositions, and attitudes is that gemeinschaftlich occupations are regarded as nominal categories and are therefore blithely aggregated or dimensionalized (see Mortimer and Lorence 1995, pp. 498-99; Watson 1995, pp. 229-32; Freidson 1994; Bourdieu 1984; Van Maanen and Barley 1984; Haas 1977; Salaman 1974; Hughes 1958; Goode 1957 ).
The larger moral to our story is that sociologists have searched for structuration at the wrong level of analysis. Ironically, class analysts have sought realist solutions at the aggregate level when only nominal ones were viable, whereas occupational analysts have settled on nominal solutions (e.g., socioeconomic scales) when in fact realist ones were feasible. We are thus arguing that the forces of occupational structuration have been too quickly dismissed. Among Marxian and non-Marxian scholars alike, the division of labor is typically represented as purely "technical" in character (see, esp., Wright 1980; Abercrombie and Urry 1983, p. 109), even though nominal task-based groupings are often converted into real social collectivities with a shared culture and set of interests. We think that sociological research stands to benefit from taking such local boundaries more explicitly into account.
This line of argumentation is advanced below by considering the implications of local structuration for understanding (a) the structure of social classes, (b) the sociological processes by which individuals are allocated into classes, (c) the tactics by which classes parlay closure into control over valued goods, and (d) the effects of class membership on attitudes, lifestyles, and consumption practices.
Mapping the Class Structure
The task of mapping the class structure is typically represented as the main analytic precondition to empirical research and hence serves as a natural starting point for us. As we have stressed, the principal mapping efforts to date presuppose a highly aggregate level of analysis (e.g., Wright 1997; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) , and the underlying contours of local structuration accordingly remain largely uncharted. In addressing this gap, one might seek to construct disaggregate classes in terms of conventional analytic criteria (e.g., exploitation), but of course the categories so defined would then be meaningful principally to academics. We prefer the realist approach of identifying local boundaries that, for whatever reason, have come to be institutionalized and are thereby salient to workers themselves.
Although conventional occupational classification schemes provide a useful basis for such research, it should not be assumed that their constituent detailed categories are in all cases socially meaningful. 2 The categories of these schemes are best treated as implicit hypotheses about local structuration; that is, the question at hand is whether conventional schemes (e.g., the 1990 Standard Occupational Classification [SOC]) define groupings that are meaningful both in terms of (a) the social categories with which workers identify, and (b) the boundaries that are defined and defended through various strategies of closure. We wish, then, to understand class structuration in the present day rather than in some hypothetical future. By contrast, neo-Marxians typically identify "latent" class boundaries (i.e., "klasse an sich") that may possibly become salient, thereby obliging them to resort to ever more ingenious accounts of the "continuous and wholesale discrepancies between class position and class behavior" (Parkin 1979, p. 113) .
The contours of local structuration have not been properly studied. There is much to be learned about the prevalence of local structuration, its distribution and patterning across the class structure, and the role of various closure devices in maintaining it (e.g., unions, licenses). The following three research questions are especially relevant in this regard:
How much local structuration is there?
In their earlier work, Grusky and Sørensen (1998) argued that the forces for structuration operate principally at the disaggregate level, but they left open the possibility that, even at that level, only a minority of occupations may be truly class-like. We likewise appreciate that disaggregation may reveal only small pockets of realist occupations interspersed in far larger regions of purely nominal categories. In conventional analyses, the posited class scheme is typically represented in either nominalist or realist terms, and the fundamentally hybrid character of modern class systems has gone unappreciated. If, instead, it is recognized that all existing class systems are a mix of nominalist and realist categories, the main empirical task of interest involves determining which type of category dominates. In taking on this issue, we recommend considering not only whether the posited categories are salient at the individual cognitive level (i.e., "class identification"), but also whether closure around those categories has been pursued and realized through such tactics as certification, licensure, and credentialing (i.e., "collective action"). The resulting analyses may, of course, ultimately serve to undermine our realist claims. That is, insofar as technically-defined "occupations" are only rarely transformed into socially meaningful categories, the case for disaggregation is admittedly weakened.
Is class-like structuration found mainly in a few select regions of the occupational structure?
While some evidence of closure will likely be found in many, if not most, regions of the occupational structure, the division of labor may remain socially disorganized in other sectors because of rapid technical change, low skill levels, and limited investments in training. Moreover, even in regions of the occupational structure that are well formed, one often finds complex webs of nested and overlapping associational forms that belie simple classification Sørensen 1998, pp. 1195-96) . It follows that clearly-demarcated boundaries may appear in only particular pockets of the class structure. If conventional wisdom is on the mark, craft and professional occupations will prove to be relatively well-organized, whereas all other occupations will register as largely nominal categories. This standard representation of local structuration remains unsubstantiated; indeed, because the field of "work and occupations" relies heavily on case studies of particular occupations (especially professions), we know rather little about the extent and forms of class-like structuration across all sectors. We would do well, then, to map the full distribution of local structuration as revealed in patterns of collective action and micro-level cognitive mappings.
How might detailed occupational schemes be revised?
The foregoing evidence will likely suggest that contemporary occupational schemes might usefully be revisited. As we see it, the task of classifying occupations should involve more than simply aggregating technically similar positions, since proceeding as such ignores the organizational barriers and combinations that convert technical distinctions into social ones. This dictum, reasonable as it may seem, is nonetheless inconsistent with conventional classification protocols that treat occupations as simple statistical aggregates of functionally similar positions (see Smith [1904 Smith [ ] 1976 . 1980, p. 8) . 3 Although such approaches have surface appeal, they fail to provide guidelines for choosing among the infinity of ways in which classifiers might combine and divide various technical tasks into unit occupations. 4 We are suggesting, then, that classifiers attend explicitly to the boundaries that are recognized by workers, represented by associations, and defended through such closure devices as occupational licensing, certification, and unionization (see Weeden 1998) . 5 When this realist formulation is adopted, we may discover that some of the conventionally defined categories require disaggregation, whereas others will benefit from aggregation or yet more complex forms of combination. 6 We appreciate, of course, that occupational structuration is not easily mapped (see, e.g., fn. 5).
However, if class analysis is indeed central to the sociological enterprise, it is worth lavishing as much attention on micro-class models as has historically been lavished on their aggregate and nominal cousins. The analyses that we have proposed here are best treated as a first step toward constructing true realist classifications of this kind.
Social Mobility
In the last 25 years, sociologists have studied social mobility with obsessive passion, yet only rarely with classifications that are adequately detailed (cf. Evans and Laumann 1983; Rytina 1992; Sørensen and Grusky 1996) . The prevailing practice has of course been to examine patterns of mobility between nominal "classes" or "strata" formed by aggregating detailed occupations in terms of their measured or presumed work conditions, market position, or socioeconomic standing. This practice might be attributed to such pragmatic considerations as (a) the relatively small samples available for mobility research and the consequent sparseness of disaggregate tables, (b) the convenience of introducing new models and methods with aggregate cross-classifications, and (c) the inertial force of sociological tradition. Whatever its sources, this conventional practice has colored our understanding of mobility regimes in ways that, for the most part, are likely to be problematic and misleading. The purpose of this section is to outline why conventional forms of descriptive, causal, and comparative mobility analysis may be flawed. If there is a theme underlying the argumentation that follows, it is that mobility is governed by the deeply institutionalized boundaries between occupations rather than by the aggregate inter-class boundaries fashioned by academics.
Descriptive Analysis
We begin by considering the implications of disaggregation for descriptive mappings of occupational persistence and inheritance. In standard mobility analyses, the clustering on the main diagonal assumes a U-shaped form, with the most extreme rigidities appearing at the top and bottom of the class structure (e.g., Featherman and Hauser 1978; Stier and Grusky 1990) . The middle class thus emerges as sufficiently fluid and permeable to cast doubt on the standard claim (e.g., Bourdieu and Passeron [1977] 1990) that stratification systems are "designed first and foremost to solve the problems of class reproduction" (Parkin 1979, p. 2; also, Kingston 2000; cf. Featherman and Hauser 1978, p. 180) . We are concerned here that such conclusions may ultimately prove to be specific to the aggregate classification schemes that sociologists conventionally adopt. Indeed, given that many middle-class occupations (e.g., printers, plumbers) have successfully pursued closure through unionization and licensing, disaggregation may reveal rather more rigidity in the middle classes than standard analyses suggest. At the top and bottom of the class structure, we may likewise uncover pockets of rigidity more extreme than conventional stories allow, again because closure will only be fully revealed when classification schemes are disaggregated to the level at which it is secured. This line of argumentation has been borne out in recent analyses of career mobility (Sørensen and Grusky 1996) . However, the case of intergenerational mobility has long been more central to the sociological agenda, and here the relevant analyses have not been completed and cannot be simply inferred from our intragenerational results. 7 As Parkin (1979, pp. 60-66) notes, the closure practices pursued by most occupations may protect current incumbents from the ravages of the marketplace, but they are imperfect devices for transferring privilege from one generation to the next. The offspring of professors, for example, cannot themselves become professors without passing through the same arduous credentialing regimen that is required of the general population, with all the pitfalls and potential for failure that this entails. It would be a mistake, then, to conclude that intergenerational reproduction is necessarily most pronounced in occupations that have successfully pursued such standard closure strategies as unionization, licensing, or credentialing.
Although most institutions of closure are indeed oriented toward protecting the privileges of current incumbents (as opposed to transmitting them intergenerationally), the supply-side aspirations, abilities, and resources that children bring to the market may be sufficiently specialized to overcome such universalistic barriers to occupational entry. The unfortunate tendency within the mobility literature has been to represent these supply-side forces as so diffuse in character as to generate reproduction principally at the level of classes rather than occupations (e.g., Bourdieu and Passeron [1990] 1977) . To be sure, the generic concepts of reproduction theory (e.g., cultural capital) undoubtedly capture some of the processes at work, but occupation-specific tastes and orientations are also transmitted intergenerationally. Moreover, when parents succeed in transferring such specialized tastes and aspirations, they can then further assist their children in realizing these aspirations by drawing on social ties that, for the most part, are concentrated within their detailed occupations rather than more widely dispersed. This argument is consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting substantial reproduction among actors, athletes, doctors, professors, coal miners, and a great many other detailed occupations (see, e.g., Rytina 1992) . Unfortunately, such "micro-inheritance" is perforce concealed in aggregate analyses, since the main diagonal of a conventional mobility table encompasses micro-level mobility as well as micro-level reproduction. It is quite possible, then, that conventional analyses understate the rigidity in modern mobility regimes.
Causal Analysis
If the descriptive contours of mobility are poorly understood, it is hardly surprising that we know yet less about the causal forces making for mobility and persistence. This state of affairs persists because conventional aggregate categories are too heterogeneous to allow analysts to adequately measure the occupation-level variables that presumably shape mobility and persistence at the macrostructural level (e.g., closure forms). Moreover, even if meaningful measurements could somehow be made, the highly-correlated dimensions underlying immobility are empirically distinguishable only by disaggregating and thereby increasing the number of "cases" (i.e., occupations) available for analysis.
There is accordingly little chance of progress on the causal front without abandoning conventional aggregate formulations.
The task of constructing meaningful causal models is further complicated because holding power is inevitably affected by the degree of "occupationalization" that prevails. 8 That is, we expect heterogeneous and poorly-defined categories to be quite porous, since the constituent occupations will be too dissimilar from one another to produce much intra-category exchange. As Sorokin ([1959] 1927, p. 439) suggested long ago, "the closer the affinity between occupations, the more intensive among them is mutual interchange of their members; and, vice versa, the greater the difference between occupations, the less is the number of individuals who shift from one group to another." The extreme immobility of farmers, for instance, might reflect the relative homogeneity of the farming stratum rather than the effects of spatial isolation, landownership, or other intrinsic features of the occupation. By contrast, the immobility parameters for relatively heterogeneous categories (e.g., "upper manuals") will likely be muted, since they reflect the weak tendencies for intra-category mobility among the many disparate occupations that constitute such categories (e.g., baker, carpenter, jeweler). This suggests that our well-known contour maps of mobility may be quite sensitive to the level of aggregation that has been assumed. If the preceding argument is carried to its logical conclusion, it further implies that the densities of immobility can be raised or lowered simply by defining a category more or less narrowly. In addressing this problem, the obvious prescription is simply to disaggregate until realist occupations are secured, thereby eliminating unwanted heterogeneity and the artifactual muting of holding power that it can generate.
We can usefully turn to modeling the macro-level causes of holding power once meaningful categories are in hand and artifactual sources of difference are, as much as possible, purged. 9 There is of course no shortage of "theories" of immobility that could inform such analyses. The well-known model of Hout (1984) implies, for example, that holding power is a function of occupational status, autonomy, and specialization (also, Hout 1988; Hout and Jackson 1986) . Although this simple specification has rightly become a standard in the field, further debate on the sources of immobility should not be closed off altogether, especially because Hout (1984) and others (e.g., Stier and Grusky 1990 ) have perforce relied on categories that are so heterogeneous that they cannot be meaningfully coded with respect to closure tactics and related sources of immobility. If mobility data are instead disaggregated to the level at which closure is secured, it becomes possible to directly represent exclusionary processes and to fashion "proximate models" of inheritance and persistence. This approach allows us, for instance, to test whether holding power is strengthened when (a) workers are spatially isolated from competing occupational opportunities (e.g., fishing and forestry workers), (b) physical capital in the form of a farm, business, or professional practice is transmittable (e.g., farmers, funeral directors, doctors), (c) exclusionary tactics such as credentialing, licensing, and unionization have been successfully applied (e.g., accountants, printers), (d) workers share all-encompassing lifestyles of the sort classically characterized as "vocations" (e.g., locomotive operators, cabinetmakers), (e) the salience and attractiveness of parental work is heightened by virtue of its prestige, status, or glamour (e.g., doctors, athletes, actors), and (f) the detailed titles constituting an occupational category are highly homogeneous (i.e., well-developed "occupationalization"). 10 If the preceding variables are adequately operationalized, a powerful proximate account of mobility processes will, for the first time, become a possibility.
Comparative Analysis
The high cost of aggregation becomes more apparent when the focus shifts to comparative research. As Sørensen suggest (1998, p. 1223) , conventional convergence hypotheses may be less plausible at the disaggregate level, since nation-specific forms of local structuration appear to be deeply institutionalized and hence resistant to standardizing change. Although convergence formulations are exceedingly popular (esp. Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) , the empirical support for them may rest, in large part, on the effectiveness of aggregation in concealing fundamental institutional differences expressed at the local level.
In this regard, the German employment system may be seen as an important limiting case, as it reveals the extent to which local institutional forms can support disaggregate structuration. We are referring, of course, to the characteristic German emphasis on vocational training and apprenticeship, both of which serve to encourage occupation-specific investments and commitments (e.g., Fligstein and Byrkjeflot 1996; Blossfeld 1992; Carroll and Mayer 1986) . The resulting system creates strong incentives for workers to decide on a trade early and to remain in that trade for the entirety of their careers. If the German system reveals, then, the limits of disaggregate structuration, the case of Japan conversely reveals the extent to which such structuration can be institutionally suppressed. The standard characterization of Japan emphasizes such features as an educational system that is generalist in orientation rather than functionally differentiated, a vocational training system that cultivates firmspecific "nenko skills" (Dore 1973 ) through teamwork and continuous job rotation, an organizational commitment to lifetime employment that further strengthens firm-specific ties at the expense of occupational ones, and a weak system of enterprise unions that cuts across functional specializations and eliminates residual craft-based loyalties (Ishida 1993; Cole 1979; Dore 1973) . This conjunction of forces produces a postoccupational system that some commentators (e.g., Casey 1995) might regard as prototypically postmodern. For our purposes, the important point here is that aggregate analyses conceal much cross-national variability in local structuration, thereby misleading analysts into adopting more strictly drawn theories of convergence than is probably warranted (see Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Featherman, Jones, and Hauser 1975) . 11 We admit that much of the preceding commentary is little more than raw speculation. For all the effort expended on mobility analysis, we are struck that so much speculation of this sort is still required, even when the simplest of descriptive questions is at stake. We have proposed new analyses pertaining to such basic issues as (a) the credibility of standard U-shaped representations of modern social fluidity, (b) the structure of recent trends in inheritance, persistence, and inter-occupational mobility, (c) the macro-level causes that generate immobility and the explanatory power of "proximate models" in representing these causes, and (d) the viability of convergence models in characterizing institutional differences that seemingly flourish at the detailed occupational level. The assumption underlying all these analyses is that a truer picture of mobility will emerge when categories are disaggregated to the level at which closure is secured.
The Process of Stratification
The foregoing arguments for disaggregation may seem less relevant to researchers working within the status attainment tradition. After all, mobility tables are based on categorical representations of the class structure, whereas studies of attainment often proceed entirely at the individual level, almost as if there were no class structure at all. Moreover, even when extra-individual concepts are brought into attainment studies, the "structure" that is referenced invariably involves firms, industries, or aggregate classes rather than detailed occupations. We argue here that such structuralist studies of attainment would profit from taking realist occupations into account.
In most cases, the new structuralists have sought to refocus attention on the proximate determinants of earnings, where these are understood as attributes of jobs as opposed to attributes of the workers occupying them. There is surely merit in introducing variables that intervene between human capital investments (e.g., schooling) and worker rewards (e.g., earnings). In our view, existing forms of structuralism are nonetheless unconvincing, since they amount to largely descriptive accounts that fail to specify a true causal linkage between the posited market structures (e.g., sectors, classes) and the dependent variables of interest. By contrast, such causal mechanisms surface more directly at the disaggregate occupational level, and models pitched at that level accordingly come closer to structural form. This argument will hopefully clarify as we review common variants of structuralism and identify some of their shortcomings. The structuralist literature is, of course, too massive to review it comprehensively (see Breiger 1995) , but the following three approaches are at least representative of the range of structuralist formulations on offer:
1. The first truly structuralist accounts appear in the context of status attainment models that represent earnings as a function of occupational status or prestige (Sewell and Hauser 1975; Yang and Sewell 1976; Treiman and Roos 1983) . The logic here, as best we understand it, is that such scalings can be viewed as "summary indicators of those aspects of job content that are the major bases of compensation" (Treiman and Roos 1983, p. 622) . This is, then, an avowedly nominalist approach; that is, neither prestige nor socioeconomic status is allowed a true causal role in determining earnings, but rather these variables are seen as indirectly tapping the compensable factors of skill, authority, and responsibility. 12 We do not mean to rule out the possibility that socioeconomic status has a true causal effect on earnings. However, insofar as such an interpretation is indeed preferred, it is high time for scholars who wish to press this case to lay out explicitly the mechanisms by which status is parlayed into earnings.
2. Although conventional attainment models can be interpreted in structuralist terms (see Sewell and Hauser 1980) , most commentators instead criticized these models for failing to attend to the social structural constraints that operate independently of individual-level traits (e.g., Horan 1978; Beck, Horan, and Tolbert 1978; Sørensen and Kalleberg 1981; Granovetter 1981) . The alternative accounts that emerged from these critiques were, in the end, refurbished versions of dual economy and market segmentation models introduced and popularized by institutional economists many decades ago (e.g., Averitt 1968; Doeringer and Piore 1971; Piore 1975; also, see Smith 1990) . In most cases, the new structuralists thus distinguished between primary and secondary market sectors, with the core claim being that earnings differ between these sectors for reasons other than differential rates of human capital investment. The wage premium in the primary sector is explained, instead, through such structural factors as (a) high rates of unionization, (b) the use of "loyalty wages" to offset high training costs, and (c) the potential for wage inflation among firms that enjoy monopoly profits and are thereby freed from market discipline. The resulting analyses have been critiqued on many fronts (e.g., Smith 1990; Hodson and Kaufman 1982; Baron and Bielby 1980) , but it is especially troubling that the underlying models may again be regarded as descriptive rather than truly structural. As Hodson and Kaufman (1982) emphasize, the posited sectors are merely proxies for various underlying causal variables (e.g., unionization, training costs, market centralization); and, worse yet, the available sectoralizations are necessarily poor proxies by virtue of the weak inter-correlations among the constituent (causal) variables. The obvious prescription is again to move toward structural form. In so doing, an occupational level of analysis will sometimes be appropriate, as the phenomena in question (e.g., training costs) are often characteristics of task niches rather than firms or industries. 13 3. The neo-Marxian models of Wright (1985; also imply that inequality reflects the characteristics of positions as well as persons. In his second-generation models, Wright (1985) distinguishes between classes on the basis of their rent-generating capacity, where "rent" refers to excess returns secured by restricting the supply of competing labor. This approach is problematic because the working institutions of closure (e.g., professional associations, craft unions) restrict the supply of labor to occupations rather than aggregate classes. As a result, the fundamental units of exploitation are occupations themselves, whereas neo-Marxian "classes" are merely heterogeneous aggregations of occupations that have similar capacities for exploitation. This heterogeneity is most pronounced at the top and bottom of the class structure; for example, the various "expert" classes of Wright (1985) combine true rent-generating professions with those in the initial stages of a closure project, while the "proletarian" category combines unorganized labor with occupations that are partly closed by virtue of licensing or unionization. The resulting models of earnings determination are accordingly unconvincing. Indeed, if the overall level of social welfare is truly less fundamental than the "underlying mechanisms which generate it" (Wright 1979, p. 206) , then class models of an aggregate sort will be of only descriptive interest.
We are advocating, then, for models of earnings determination that recognize occupations as fundamental units of exploitation. If closure is to be translated into rewards, occupations must exert tangible or symbolic control over the supply of labor that is available to perform the tasks associated with their functional niches. This control may be achieved in various ways, but the main tactics in modern economies involve (a) establishing educational requirements for occupational incumbency, (b) instituting a licensing system based on such criteria as formal testing, training programs, or character requirements, (c) organizing unions that control the supply of labor through apprenticeship systems, closed shops, and collective bargaining, and (d) establishing occupational associations that advocate for tangible forms of closure (e.g., licensing) and that form symbolic monopolies by identifying certain tasks (e.g., diagnosing illnesses) with certain occupations (e.g., physicians). The foundation for a plausible structuralist account can thus be found in closure theory. In drawing on such theory, it becomes possible to capture real institutional forces that are proximate determinants of earnings, whereas more conventional codings by prestige, sector, or class are sociological abstractions lacking in equally obvious institutional referents. Although conventional structuralist formulations are far easier to implement than true closure-based models, Weeden (1998) is assembling an occupation-level archive of closure data that should make our more ambitious approach feasible. 14
Class Cultures and Lifestyles
As Giddens (1973) puts it, class analysts should consider not merely patterns of "mediate structuration" expressed in opportunities for mobility, but also patterns of "proximate structuration" revealed in the association between class and such outcomes as attitudes, lifestyles, and political behavior. There has of course been much interest of late in understanding the micro-level association between class and culture (e.g., Brint 1994; Lamont 1992; Bourdieu 1984; DiMaggio 1982) . Indeed, because contemporary scholars have retreated from comprehensive class-based theories of history, modern class analysis increasingly entails little more than describing the micro-level association between class membership and life chances of various kinds. Although we have no quarrel with this refashioned agenda, we are troubled that it has typically been implemented by either scaling occupations (e.g., Kohn and Schooler 1983) or aggregating them (e.g., Wright 1985) . These conventional approaches are problematic insofar as they obscure the real subcultures generated at the detailed occupational level. If analyses are instead pitched at this level, the correspondence between objective conditions and lifestyles might become sufficiently strong to cast doubt on the postmodern retreat from production-based groupings.
The empirical question that arises, then, is whether conventional aggregations or scalings can adequately represent the relationship between class and culture. The following research questions are relevant in this regard:
1. Are the effects of social class fully captured by aggregate categories? If class analysts are indeed increasingly focused on individual-level effects, they should presumably have more than passing interest in the analytic level at which such effects operate. This issue can be addressed by decomposing the total association between class and its many correlates (e.g., attitudes, lifestyles) into components generated within and between standard aggregate categories. In so proceeding, the costs of aggregation are assessed in terms of explanatory power foregone, thus providing a quantitative measure of the penalty paid for ignoring realist categories at the subclass level.
Is aggregation more defensible in some sectors of the class structure than in others?
The costs of aggregation may be especially high in certain regions of the class structure. For example, the lifestyles and consumption practices of nonmanual workers are likely to be quite heterogeneous, as here occupations are typically well-formed and their incumbents are accordingly exposed to distinctive cultures and socializing experiences. The lower manual sector is, by contrast, typically represented as a relatively homogeneous zone in which occupationalization is weakly developed. As plausible as it is, this standard account has not yet been pitted against any number of alternatives, most notably the null hypothesis that academics are merely more sensitive to occupational distinctions in class regions with which they are most familiar. This hypothesis can be addressed by cross-classifying detailed occupations against various outcomes (e.g., lifestyles, attitudes) and then sequentially testing for collapsibility of the categories comprising each aggregate class.
Are the effects of social class adequately captured by conventional occupational scalings?
The class analytic tradition has frequently been criticized for glossing over intra-class differentiation and heterogeneity (e.g., Kingston 2000) . In most cases, the critics have been especially troubled by gradational forms of heterogeneity, and some type of vertical or socioeconomic scaling is accordingly the prescription of choice. There are two scaling approaches of particular interest within this literature (see DiMaggio 2001). Namely, the American variant of gradationalism emphasizes the "structural imperatives" of routinization, substantive complexity, and related workplace conditions (esp. Kohn and Schooler 1983) , whereas the French variant treats occupations as subtle signals of the economic and cultural capital that incumbents typically control (esp. Bourdieu 1984) . Although there is merit in both approaches, it is still worth asking whether the organic cultures of true gemeinschaftlich groupings can be safely reduced to a vector of scores on a few variables. There is good reason for skepticism on this point; after all, the effects of class that emerge under either approach are typically quite weak, so much so that Kingston (2000) has built his case against class analysis largely on the claim that "proximate structuration" has all but disappeared under advanced industrialism. If this critique is to be convincingly addressed, we need to know whether the effects of class are weak only because the discipline has adopted poor measurements of class.
Are some occupations especially well-formed?
The contours of disaggregate structuration are likewise of interest. Although the conventional story here is that craft occupations are paradigmatic in their fusing of work and lifestyle (Mills 1956, p. 223) , we suspect that well-developed lifestyles also exist elsewhere in the occupational structure. The available evidence, such as it is, suggests that disaggregate structuration will be most pronounced when (a) training is harsh or lengthy (e.g., doctors, professors), (b) workers are isolated or stigmatized (e.g., sanitation workers, loggers, carnival workers), or (c) recruitment is highly self-selective by virtue of social networks, economic barriers to entry, or the unusual tastes and skills that an occupation requires (e.g., actors, farmers, morticians). These hypotheses can be pursued by examining the heterogeneity of lifestyles and behaviors within given occupations.
Is there any evidence of class destructuration?
In postmodern circles, the main debates of interest address issues of trend quite explicitly, with the most extreme accounts implying that all forms of structuration at the site of production are weakening. This position, which was once regarded as heretical, has now "taken for granted among contemporary social and cultural analysts" (Casey 1995, p. 8) . In our view, it is unwarranted to foreclose on all further debate, especially because trends in aggregate and disaggregate structuration may not move together in lockstep fashion. Indeed, insofar as class formation is inhibited by craft unions, professional associations, and other forms of occupationalization (e.g., Lipset 1996) , it is surely a mistake to treat "structuration" as a single dimension that is simultaneously expressed at the level of classes and occupations. There is, then, much room for a comprehensive exploration of trends at all levels of analysis. As best we can determine, virtually all relevant research pertains to trends in aggregate structuration, and even here such evidence as exists refers almost exclusively to class-based voting and related forms of political behavior (e.g., Evans 1997). The available evidence thus falls well short of substantiating a "class deconstruction" thesis in the broad and encompassing terms that it usually takes.
Are patterns of class structuration cross-nationally variable?
When comparative analyses are attempted, the tendency has been to default to highly aggregate class schemes, either because the data are too sparse to allow for disaggregation or because comparable categories cannot be defined at more detailed levels.
It bears reiterating in this context that class structuration need not be consistently expressed at all levels of analysis. In fact, low-level structuration (e.g., craft unionization) is sometimes assumed to undermine aggregate organizational forms, with the United States often cited as a typical case in point.
The example of Sweden, by contrast, suggests that class-based organization may sometimes flourish in the absence of competing local structuration (e.g., Rehn 1985) . As Esping-Andersen (1990) notes, the well-known solidarism of labor is coupled with "active labor market" programs that provide state assistance for worker retraining and relocation, thus blurring interoccupational boundaries and undermining local sectionalism and closure. In this case, unit occupations are still defined by functional positions in the division of labor, but the social trappings that usually emerge around such technical distinctions (e.g., occupational associations) are partly repressed. While Sweden appears, then, to be properly characterized by the neo-Marxian formula that "technical features do not entail social features" (Abercrombie and Urry 1983, p. 109) , it is unclear whether this form of structuration extends beyond Sweden and Scandinavia more generally.
We are thus advocating for a comprehensive cross-national mapping of proximate structuration at both the detailed and aggregate levels. By ignoring local solidarities, analysts can easily misinterpret the alleged weakness of aggregate structuration as evidence of generic destructuration, and the postmodernist retreat from the productive sphere becomes difficult to resist. This retreat rests, however, on the questionable assumption that local and aggregate forms of structuration necessarily move in tandem.
Conclusions
In his celebrated preface to The Division of Labor, Durkheim ([1893 Durkheim ([ ] 1933 predicted that occupational associations would gradually become "intercalated between the state and the individual," thereby providing an organizational counterbalance to the threat of class formation on one hand and state tyranny on the other. This account is ritually rehearsed by scholars of Durkheim, but has never been treated as a credible developmental model. As the Marxian project falls out of favor, scholars have therefore settled into some version of Weberianism or postmodernism, neither of which pays much attention to occupation-level structuration. We have outlined a quasi-Durkheimian third road that refocuses attention on local forms of structuration within the division of labor.
If there is any larger conclusion to be drawn, it is that sociologists have been too quick to fall back on purely nominal categories and the descriptive models that they imply. The long-standing Marxian distinction between "klasse an sich" and "klasse für sich" only reinforces such nominalist tendencies, as it legitimates the claim that conventional aggregate categories, while presently latent or quiescent, may someday become meaningful and activated. This approach is of course peculiarly modern. In characterizing stratification systems of the past, sociologists have typically relied on categories that were embedded in the fabric of society (e.g., estates, castes), thereby rendering them sensible and meaningful to intellectuals and the lay public alike.
The modern-day analogues to such realist categories are the unit occupational groups that emerge around functional positions in the division of labor. If analyses are ratcheted down to this level, we can construct models that rely on real institutional forces and assume more nearly structural form. The proof of our approach rests, then, on the additional explanatory power and understanding that accrues from referencing the real institutional processes that create classes, constrain mobility chances, generate earnings, and define lifestyles. Although the task of mapping disaggregate stratification is hardly trivial, the intellectual payoff to so proceeding is likely to be greater than that secured by carrying out yet another study at the aggregate level.
The discipline has invested millions of dollars and untold person-hours in devising, testing, and applying aggregate models of class (e.g., Wright 1997; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) . In the end, this amounts to a massive disciplinary gamble on aggregate formulations, one which seems to have been entered unwittingly and without consideration for plausible alternatives. It is high time to determine whether this gamble has paid off and, if not, to cut our losses and place new bets on approaches that are sociologically more defensible.
